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Colonel Tsuji of Malaya (part 3)

"Kill all prisoners"

When Gen Masaharu Homma ran into unexpected difficult mopping up the Fil-American troops on the Bataan Peninsula, he was promised reinforcements consisting of the 4th Division under Lt Gn Kenzo Kitamura; a 4,000-man detachment from the 21st Div under Maj Gen Kameichiro Nagano; more artillery and aircraft; a new chief of staff, Maj Gen Takaji Wachi--and Tsuji. He left Singapore a few days before the collapse of Gen Jonathan Wainwright's army on the Bataan Peninsula. Gen Homma assumed he'd capture 25,000 prisoners on Bataan. The job of coping with them was given to transport officer Maj Gen Yoshikata Kawane, who divided the operation into two phases. First Col Toshimitsu Takatsu would assemble all the prisoners at Balanga, halfway up the peninsula, a march of 19 miles at most, so no transportation would be needed, and the prisoners would have their own rations. A field hospital would be set up at Balanga. From here on, they would be given Japanese army field rations. Kawane would supervise the northward transportation, using 200 trucks to shuttle them 33 miles to the railroad at San Fernando, where another field hospital would be set up. Then they would be carried by freight car 30 miles to Capas, near Clark Field. Finally they would march 8 miles to Camp O'Donnell. Homma approved the plan, not realizing that the men were starving and sick, and that there were 76,000 of them.

Tsuji believed that all prisoners should be executed, the Americans because they were colonialists and the Filipinos because they had betrayed their fellow Asians. Evidently convinced by this logic, a division staff officer phoned Colonel Imai and told him: "Kill all prisoners and those offering to surrender." Imai, who already held more than a thousand Fil- American prisoners, demanded that the order be put in writing, then he released his prisoners into the rain forest. A similar order was received by a recently arrived garrison commander, Maj Gen Torao Ikuta, who was told by the staff officer who called him that his own division was already executing prisoners. Ikuta also asked for a written order. But other officers, whose names for good reason have vanished from the record, carried out Tsuji's oral instructions, which were reinforced by the press. On April 28, the Japan Times & Advertiser wrote of the white soldiers: "They surrender after sacrificing all the lives they can, except their own. . . . they cannot be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. They have broken the commandments of God, and their defeat is their punishment. To show them mercy is to prolong the war. . . . An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Hesitation is uncalled for, and the wrongdoers must be wiped out."

Homma had ordered his troops to respect the Filipinos, and to refrain from raping and looting them. His benevolence angered both his immediate superior, Gen Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, and likewise those of his underlings who followed the lead of Col Tsuji--and his colleague from the Taiwan Army Research Section, Yoshihide Hayashi, now a major general and military administrator of the 14th Army.

When Maj Gen Kiyotake Kawaguchi, commander in the Visayans, was ordered to execute Chief Justice Jose Santos and his son, he responded with the suggestion that instead Santos be given a position in the Filipino puppet government. Homma evidently approved this suggestion and gave Hayashi instructions that it be carried out. Nevertheless, the message came back to Kawaguchi: "His guilt is obvious. Dispose of him immediately." Kawagchi then wrote his classmate Hayashi. This time, an order came back to deliver Santos father and son to Davao for execution; it was followed by an officer to ensure the executions were carried out. Kawaguchi then had the chief justice shot, but spared his son and again complained to Gen Homma, who expressed his regret and evidently fingered Hayashi and also rebuked him. Kawaguchi confronted Hayashi next day. "What a shameful thing you did," he said. "I trusted you as my classmate." Hayashi replied: "But Imperial Headquarters was so insistence about the execution of Santos." Kawaguchi: "Whom do you mean by Imperial Headquarters?" Hayashi: "It was Tsuji."

Others were sentenced to death in the same fashion, including Gen Manuel Roxas, former speaker of the Philippines House of Representatives. Roxas's execution order was issued in the name of Gen Homma and stamped by Hayashi and three staff officers. The officers holding him ignored the order, and Roxas survived to become the first president of an independent Philippines.

Lending a hand at Guadalcanal

By summer of 1942 the tide was turning against Japan, as shown in August by the landing of U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. The Japanese estimated that 2,000 men were ashore, and dispatched 6,000 men to clear them out. The largest group was Kawaguchi Detachment with 3,500 men under the general who had saved Roxas. He surmised that the battle would actually be a decisive and perhaps deadly one, and ordered that his troops be given 3 months' pay for what might be their last blowout. By the time the battle was joined, there were 19,000 Americans on the island. Worse, the Japanese were already half-starved. They rendered the island's name Gadarukanaru; among other things, "ga" means hunger, so Guadalcanal was soon dubbed Starvation Island. While the marines were reinforced by 4,000 more men, Kawaguchi Detachment died in suicide charges on what became known as Bloody Ridge.

Tsuji persuaded his superiors in Tokyo to send him to Rabaul as an observer. As usual, he soon became a go-between, arguing the army's need for a full-scale relief expedition to Admiral Yamamoto aboard the flagship Yamato. Yamamoto saw in the relief an opportunity for the "decisive battle" to win the Pacific War. Tsuji returned to Rabaul to work out the details with Lt Gen Harukichi Hyakutake's staff officer, Col Haruo Konuma, a classmate of his from the Military Academy. But by Oct 20, when reinforcements came ashore the troops were in such terrible shape that Tsuji and Konuma had to scrap their battle plan and devise a surprise night attack on Henderson Field from the rear. A 15-mile trail had been cut through terrain so difficult that for most of the distance soldiers had to crouch to pass beneath the branches. Air, naval, and artillery bombardment so devastated the airfield that only 11 American planes were able to get off, and they inflicted only minor damage on the Japanese ships, enabling 4,000 troops, supplies, and heavy guns to get ashore. Though numerically stronger, the U.S. Marines by this time were badly worn down by two months of combat.

The Japanese assault force consisted of 5,600 infantry plus support troops, with Tsuji personally directing operations. Each man carried an artillery shell or piece of a field gun in addition to his own gear. Cooking was not allowed. By the third day, men were so exhausted that they had to abandon equipment by the trail.

Tsuji detested Kawaguchi for his softness toward Roxas in the Philippines. The general was genial to Tsuji, however. "I'm glad to find you here," he said, and outlined his misgivings about the attack plan. He regarded the terrain as too rough for the frontal assault that had been assigned to him, and navy photographs suggested that the Americans had strengthened their positions; he wanted to move behind the enemy's eastern flank. "I don't need to see the pictures," Tsuji said. "I'm familiar with the terrain and I agree fully with your proposal." Kawaguchi suggested they take it to Lt Gen Masao Maruyama, who had the command of the larger force. "I will explain personally to His Excellency Maruyama," Tsuji replied. "I wish you great success." They shook hands. "Well, the battle is really getting interesting, isn't it?" he added with a laugh.

The attack was finally set for midnight on 24-25 Oct, with every man "to fight desperately and fulfill his duty in repayment of His Majesty's favor." Kawaguchi however was still 36 hours from the newly-agreed assault line. He cable-phoned Maruyama but was told there could be no delay, and Kawaguchi realized that Tsuji had never told the commander about the change in plans. Kawaguchi responded that he would have one battalion in position, whereupon he was replaced--Tsuji's intention, apparently. Tsuji called 17th Army Hq and told his colleague Col Konuma that "Kawaguchi refused to advance, and the division commander relieved him of his command."

In the end, the diversionary attack was launched prematurely, costing 9 tanks and 600 infantrymen--and alerting the Americans, who on the 24th spotted rice fires and scouts. That night, the leading battalions attacked and was were almost immediately pinned down by American fire. Tsuji was struck with "an omen of doom" and his bones "felt cold." By dawn, one of the best regiments in the 2nd Division had been virtually destroyed. A naval assault force, assuming the field had been seized on schedule, was savaged by planes from Henderson Field. Nevertheless Yamamoto decided to press the naval attack. Ashore, the 2nd Division commander personally led the attack and was fatally shot along with most of his officers. The division lost 3,000 men in the two-day battle.

continued in part 4