As the 12th Sentai approached Rangoon River, the lead plane--with the group commander on board--experienced engine trouble. The pilot, Capt. Kusakari, therefore left the group and dropped to 3,500 meters, intending to return to Bangkok. Without radio communication between the bombers, the other flights did not understand his maneuver and followed him to the lower altitude. The 1st chutai leader, Yoshikuma OURA, took up the lead position, and the formation returned to its assigned altitude, but by this time they were lagging the 60th Sentai instead of leading it as planned. The 60th Sentai bombers climbed to 6000 meters and turned right, evidently to pass north of Rangoon.

The 12th Sentai did not go to the higher altitude and instead began its bombing run--one report says from 3,000 meters--so was able to drop its bombs on schedule, hitting the electric power plant in Rangoon. The Sallys then turned for home, whereupon they were attacked by 20-30 enemy fighters--evidently the AVG Tomahawks. The 64th Sentai Hayabusas had stayed with the 12th Sentai and now engaged the Tomahawks. The Japanese pilots noticed that the enemy pilots used a technique of making one strike and then quickly escaping by diving away. They also reported that the machine guns in the Hayabusas were not adequate in combat with the P-40s.

The Hayabusas had been assigned to protect both sentais, so the division of the formation caused the pilots great difficulty. The Hayabusas at first stayed with the 12th Sentai. But Kato was very concerned about 60th, so he left the group and went along with the other group. Meanwhile, Buffaloes and "Hurricanes" concentrated on 12th Sentai. The main force of the 64th Sentai engaged them, which resulted in the bombers losing their escort and leaving them vulnerable to the enemy fighters. Kato saw this from behind and hurried back to the 12th Sentai and shot down several enemy fighters. In one account, the 64th Sentai pilots claimed 10 Allied fighters shot down. For their part, the 12th Sentai gunners claimed 12 or 19 enemy fighters, depending on which account you read.

Meanwhile, the 12th Sentai had 3 Sallys shot down. A fourth was damaged and on the home home was forced to land in a bamboo forest; the plane was destroyed but the crew survived. One of the returning Sallys had been hit by 80 bullets, with shrapnel flying all around, with so many injured it was "like a sea of blood." In that plane, two gunners and the pilot were dead.

For its part, the 60th Sentai at 6,000 meters turned right and gradually descended, and at 2 p.m. dropped its bombs on Mingaladon airport. On the way home, it was attacked by 4-5 enemy aircraft, which inflicted some damage but all planes returned safely.

The 10th Hikodan

The second Japanese formation made its rendezvous at 12:45 p.m., 4,000 meters above the JAAF fighter strip at Raheng. The 10th Hikodan had the same composition as two days earlier, though the number of heavy bombers had been cut almost in half, the 62nd Sentai having "many warriors lost in the battle on Dec. 23."

On their way to the target, they met 20 Tomahawks and Buffaloes in the air and began to fight. The Buffaloes concentrated on the heavy bombers. 77th Sentai fighters tried very hard to protect them, shooting down four Buffaloes. (Five Buffalo pilots lost their lives on Dec. 25, effectively removing 67 Squadron from the air defense of Rangoon.) "Bullets were flying all over," according to one Japanese report. This caused the escorts to lose contact with the formation they were supposed to protect.

The Sallys dropped their bombs at 1:50 p.m. from an altitude of 4,700 meters. One airman reported that the explosions were "like a flower blossoming." By the time they had fought through the target, their defensive ammunition was almost gone: three planes had expended all their ammunition, while another had only 75 rounds remaining.

Two "Nate" fighters of the 77th Sentai were shot down and their pilots killed, while the pilot of a third parachuted to safety and was taken prisoner. (One Japanese historian notes that the PW was "Korean-born," which presumably explained his preference for captivity over an honorable death in battle.) A fourth Nate was leaking fuel and forced to leave the battle; the pilot crashed near the Thai border and returned safely to Raheng.

Both bomber sentais bombed Mingaladon and returned without loss, having destroyed 5 enemy fighters on the ground and damaging 3 larger planes, plus damage to runways and other facilities.

The 77th Sentai pilots were claiming 8 Buffaloes shot down, plus 4 "uncertain". Depending on which account you prefer, the grand total for Dec. 25 therefore was 30-41 Allied fighters shot down--as with the previous raid, more planes than were stationed at Rangoon.

The aftermath

At Bangkok, it was reported that enemy fighters were pursuing the bombers and attacking them, so four "Shoki" fighters of the 47th Independent Chutai took off to intercept the bombers and escort them back to Bangkok. However, they failed to meet. The Japanese commander (Sugaware, presumably) became anxious about his planes when he saw that the bombers were returning one by one instead of in formation, as they should have done. Overall, in the two Rangoon attacks, he had lost 12 heavy bombers, along with 64 crewmen killed and 3 taken prisoner. He therefore stopped Rangoon attack and the next day went to Sungei Pataini to take part in the assault on Singapore.

From their experience at Rangoon, the Japanese concluded that they had not sufficient appreciated the power of enemy anti-aircraft fire and the ability of enemy fighters to intercept. So they realized how important it was for the formations to attack as one, with mutual cooperation. One officer declared that this was the reality of air strategy: they had suffered great losses because of the willingness of the Allied fighters to press the attack. However, it was good experience for the future. A warning was sent out to all JAAF units to this effect.

The commander of the 60th Sentai, Colonel Ogawa, pointed out that his group had flown to the target with 36 Sallys, while the 12th Sentai had only 20, making it easier for the 12th to maneuver together. That was why they were able to bomb first. He noted that the enemy fighters had "incredible" speed and that they used a tactic of "shooting and leaving" (hit and run). He speculated that the fighters concentrated on the 12th Sentai because it had fewer planes. He suggested, therefore, that the 60th Sentai ought to be used in the leading position, with the others following it and harmonizing their actions to it.

One Japanese history notes that the 77th Sentai at this time had 16 planes outfitted with armor plate--the first mention of protective armor that I have seen in Japanese sources. (I can't determine whether these were 16 replacement Nates or a refitting of the existing planes.) The armor plate was 9 mm thick--a bit more than a third of an inch. As the Japanese historian points out, it was bit ironic that the AVG Tomahawks (and some of the Buffaloes) were protected by half-inch armor plate, while facing only the 7.7 mm bullets of the Japanese, while the Japanese fighters had thinner plate to protect them against the half-inch guns on the Allied fighters.