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Nomonhan (part 3)

S.K.>"It should be added that Soviet pilots of that time preferred dogfighting as a rule". "Contrary to what Mr Stepanov said, diving with Japanese fighters was prohibited because already in China many I-16s had been lost while following their counterparts. I-16's mixed structure enabled no sharp pullouts: so the Japanese usually waited until the "boomer" had passed and then downed it while the Russian pilot was struggling with G-forces. Any talk about "boom & zoom" tactics applied at that time is sheer nonsense. Remember, we are talking about all-metal fighters vs. mixed structure Polikarpovs that had only marginal strip of metal in order to keep their engines in place".

There are other viewpoints on this issue. For example, W.Green & G. Swanborough in "Japanese Army Fighters" stated that at Nomonhan I-16s used "hit and run" tactic against Ki.27: the former swooped on the Japanese and then disengaged thus avoiding the dogfight.

A famous test-pilot S.Suprun wrote: " I-16 can disengage only by long steep diving_ The common way of combat for I-16 was utilization of attitude and horizontal speed gained after attack due to acceleration. When attack is over, I-16 descends and _ gains the attitude for the next attack."

The I-16 construction strength can be estimated from the following account by S.Belolipetskiy "V srazhayushchemsya Kitaye" ('In the warring China').

In July 1938 A.Gubenko, who fought for C.A.F. in the Central China, demonstrated aerobatics in his I-16 over Nanchang airfield: "Anton ended his show by unusual and dangerous maneuver. His plane made a steep dive from high attitude with engine at full throttle that was roaring and spitting black fumes of smoke. Over the ground the plane aprupted steep diving into steep climbing".

In my opinion it is pure power-dive.

Note that several months after the Nomonhan war, I-16s were successfully used for strafing and bombing in dive-attacks of the Finnish ground targets during the Winter War.

On the contrary, the Japanese monoplane I-97 (or Ki.27) was not suited for long diving. For example, N.Yakubovich in his paper "Tam vdali za rekoy" ('There, far across the river') quoted the report by A.S.Nikolayev, who was Captain of VVS RKKA:

"I-97 dived steeply lesser then 700-1.000 meters, then they stopped the chase. During interrogation the captured {Japanese} airmen were asked why they were diving steeply but not long. The latter stated that there was considerable vibration of wings, especially their cantilevers and the engine was rapidly cooling off (it could halt after). There was an episode during the combats when the cantilever of I-97 was torn off during diving. {The I-97} was chased by I-153 (its pilot was Captain A.S.Nikolayev). The cantilever disintegrated after 500-700 m diving; the possibility of the wing damage in the chase was impossible as the fire was aimed to the cockpit. The eyewitnesses confirmed that it was brand-new aircraft."

S.K.>I-153 Chaika mentioned by Coox was intended to replace the I-152 biplanes and retractable gear was the main difference between the two modifications. Contrary to what was said, it had the same (and rather unreliable) 750hp M-25V engine like old I-152 and I-16 and its performance was disappointing. Structural integrity once again presented the main problem of the new version and Vorozheikin mentioned in your account personally saw one of them "folding its wings like a butterfly" in combat.

In the second half of summer 1939 a batch on new biplanes I-153 'Chaika' was deployed. They had the M-62 engine (not M-25) and were inferior to monoplanes I-16s.

I quite agree that I-153 was unfortunate aircraft. Its engine could stopped in diving and its wings could disintegrated. The undercarriage was also unreliable. The mass production of this plane was a serious mistake of the Soviet leadership.

S.K.>Another important factor to be considered is the difference in training. While JAAF pilots had "upwards of 1,000hrs flight time", the bulk of Soviet V-VS pilots of that time usually flew 100-120hrs yearly. Of course there were some exceptions, such like the veterans who had fought in Spain and China.

Again, I agree with this statements. I believe that the Japanese airmen were the best at this time. A fighter-pilot B.Smirnov, who took part in the Spanish Civil war and later added air victories at Nomonhan to his score, stated: "I think that the Japanese airmen are more skilled then the Germans and more aggressive then the Italians".

But the advantage of extensive training was, in fact, sad disadvantage, too. It was impossible to recover the losses fast and adequately. The Nomonhan was a dressed rehearsal and later, during proper WWII the Japanese were doomed to meet the crisis again.

S.K.>According to Soviet intelligence data, the I-97 had two Vickers machine guns (most Soviets fighters were having four) and a "major design flaw--oil cooler located before the engine that could be hit easily". Thus it was advised to attack Ki-27 head-on. No word was said about Ki-27's advantages, such as all-metal construction, radio equipment and closed cockpit or its range (which was at least 565 ms longer than that of the newest I-16).

Ki.27 was light and maneuverable fighter and the listed features were great achievements indeed. But the metal construction lead to higher price of aircraft and decreased productions volume, which were rather low. On the contrary, the mixed wooden metal construction of I-16 allowed to mass product this plane against the deficit of aluminum in USSR. Note that in WWII the Japanese also had to use wood in the fighters' construction.

It is known that both JAAF and JNAF airmen used to fly with the cockpits opened for better visibility, so the advantage of the closed cockpit seems elusive to me.

S.K.>The revelation that the Japanese fighters were more than a match for their own was a major shock for Soviet top brass. In order to save his face Polikarpov (the Soviet "Fighter King") organized a fancy mock combat with a captured Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane against I-16 monoplane before the members of the Soviet government, including Stalin. It's not hard to guess which fighter won. Stalin was not to be fooled so easily, however. Polikarpov soon fell into disfavour and was replaced with younger designers like Mikoyan or Yakovlev. After Nomonhan bloodletting the "mutual support" doctrine was finally abandoned but meanwhile the Soviets had produced so many biplanes that they simply could not replace them before the next war began.

After the Nomonhan the JAAF abandoned the idea to have light agile fighter and decided to go on the Western way of high-powered fighter. (e.g. W.Green & G. Swanborough)

This mentioned combat was described in the book "Under the Red Star" (Vol.1) by K.-F. Geust in quite different way:

"In the recent history of NII VVS the dramatic testing of the Nakajima I-95 is also reported: the captured aircraft was delivered by train from Mongolia to the NII VVS at Chalovskaya, where it was first flown by Aleksey I. Kubyshkin. After the initial tests it was decided to organize a simulated dogfight between the Polikarpov 1-153 Chaika and the Japanese fighter in August 1939. The People's Commissar of Defense Kliment Ye. Voroshilov and the top command of the Soviet Air Force were invited to attend the dog fight demonstration, with Kubyshkin piloting the Soviet fighter and Mikhail N. Vakhrushev (the second NII VVS test pilot to fly the 1-95 after Kubyshkin) piloting the Japanese fighter.

"After chasing each other for six minutes the eagerly awaited result was finally achieved, as Kubyshkin was able to hang at the I-95's tail and take a good aim. Vakhrushev however did not want to give in, but wanted to show his best and did his utmost to escape. His violent turn resulted in a tragedy - the Japanese fighter started spinning, and at the low altitude crashed and exploded in the forest surrounding the aerodrome. After having expressed his regrets to the head of NII VVS Gen. Filin, Voroshilov departed, leaving the upset Kubyshkin mouming his test pilot colleague and friend.

As we see, neither N.N.Polikarpov, nor I.V. Stalin were involved or present at this contest. It was the leadership of VVS RKKA decided to test if new Soviet biplane is better then the Japanese one or not. Judging the results, the combat cannot be considered as "fancy and mock". There is one more version of the event in the Soviet literature. According to memoir of prominent test-pilot P.Stefanovskiy "300 neizvestnykh" ('300 Unknown Ones') not I-153, but I-15bis participated the combat. However, no-one mentioned I-16 at all.

S.K.>Speaking of Soviet losses. . . A source from long-forgotten glasnost time (Grif sekretnosti snyat, Moscow 1993) admits already a still higher number than 207. I would also advise to check up Lt.Gen. Krivosheev's book.

I have an exemplar of this book. There were no data about Soviet aircraft losses at Nomonhan. The book contains only partial data of the Soviet airmen losses there.

I don't consider the figure of 207 lost aircraft as final. However, the interesting data from "Grif sekretnosti snyat" are far from being accurate and complete. The book itself is rather biased and it can be easily proved. In my opinion, the sweet magic word Glasnost is not equivalent for Revelation.

My best regards,
Aleksey A. Stepanov,
Samara, Russia
23 February 2000