Nomonhan (part 2)

continued from part 1

Alexei Stepanov on the Annals of Military Aviation message board:

Apparently, [a fourth wing, or hikodan] was formed in the end of the actions.... Therefore, one can assume that the fourth wing (if existed) might contain 11 Sentai, 64 Sentai and the newly arrived 59 Sentai.

My special thanks for the information about claims of 64 Sentai at Nomonhan. Surely, the victory claims of both sides (JAAF and VVS) were enourmously exaggerated. According to official Soviet data, VVS claimed more then 650 enemy a/c; the VVS losses were stated as 143 a/c. Later, in 1980-ies, this estiamtion of own Soviet losses was revised upwards: 207 a/c (including 160 fighter planes). So it is interesting to compare this data with the JAAF victory claims (1000+) and real losses of the Japanese a/c....

[About Russian pilots using a "boom & zoom" tactic to counter the more-maneuverable Japanese fighters in China:] According to information from the Soviet pilots, Nakajima Ki-27 had a serious weakness: the wing-tips of the plane had insufficient strength. If a Japanese would choose to dive away, the wings could have desintegrated during the sharp pulling-down. So the Japanese had neither possibility to break away by diving, nor the way to follow the Soviet "boomers".

Sander Kingsepp comments further:

Dear Sir,

I read your account about Coox's book (air battles during the Nomonhan conflict) and found it very interesting. I am an aviation fan from Estonia aged 36 and have researched this campaign myself. Besides reading Russian memoirs dealing with the conflict I also had a chance to discuss it with two veterans from Soviet side. From Coox's excerpts I somehow got the impression that the Japanese were the only ones who took a beating. This is certainly not true. Soviet losses in air were at least as appalling and all survivors still consider themselves members of a chosen (and lucky) club.

First some comments on planes involved in this conflict. The main Soviet fighters in Mongolia were Polikarpov I-152 biplane (I-15bis in Russian parlance) and Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 monoplane (better known as the Rata). According to "mutual support" doctrine the more agile biplanes had to engage enemy fighters so that monoplanes could simultaneously bust the bombers. You certainly wonder why it wasn't the other way round. The cause was in unstable flying characteristics of I-16--it simply could not hit anything smaller than a decent two-engined bomber. I'd like to quote the book Fighters of WW II edited by David Donald (Grange Books 1998, p 132): "Trying to bring guns to bear on another aircraft needed great skill and concentration... Any prolonged air combat, or tight turns, needed great skill and experience if the aircraft (I-16) was not to flick and spin." Such teamwork between mono- and biplanes had functioned in Spain and (not so well) in China, where biplane losses were already higher.

It should be added that Soviet pilots of that time preferred dogfighting as a rule. The Polikarpov fighters had a good turn rate (I-152 could master a full circle in some 11 seconds) and the Russians were confident to out-turn every other plane on earth. We should also remember that the only thing that was known about the Japanese that time was that they "could not take high Gs because of their fragile stature".

Another important factor to be considered is the difference in training. While JAAF pilots had "upwards of 1,000hrs flight time", the bulk of Soviet V-VS pilots of that time usually flew 100-120hrs yearly. Of course there were some exceptions, such like the veterans who had fought in Spain and China.

Already on May 29 the first replacement consisting of Spain and China vets was sent from Moscow to Mongolia (they were flying on brand-new DC-3s, by the way). Among 48 pilots 22 had the coveted title of the Hero of the Soviet Union (the equivalent of the Congressional Medal of Honor). At the end of June the Soviets had at least 150 fighters and 116 bombers ready (according to the official Soviet history of the conflict entitled 20 August 1939, by Yevgeni Gorbunov, Moscow 1986).

At the first briefing after arrival the pilots were told that their main opponent was "I-97 (Ki-27 Type 97) fighter, an inferior development of I-96" (A5M2--an opinion that still regularly appears in Russian publications). According to Soviet intelligence data, the I-97 had two Vickers machine guns (most Soviets fighters were having four) and a "major design flaw--oil cooler located before the engine that could be hit easily". Thus it was advised to attack Ki-27 head-on. No word was said about Ki-27's advantages, such as all-metal construction, radio equipment and closed cockpit or its range (which was at least 565 ms longer than that of the newest I-16).

Contrary to what Mr Stepanov said, diving with Japanese fighters was prohibited because already in China many I-16s had been lost while following their counterparts. I-16's mixed structure enabled no sharp pullouts: so the Japanese usually waited until the "boomer" had passed and then downed it while the Russian pilot was struggling with G-forces. Any talk about "boom & zoom" tactics applied at that time is sheer nonsense. Remember, we are talking about all-metal fighters vs. mixed structure Polikarpovs that had only a marginal strip of metal in order to keep their engines in place.

I-153 Chaika mentioned by Coox was intended to replace the I-152 biplanes and retractable gear was the main difference between the two modifications. Contrary to what was said, it had the same (and rather unreliable) 750hp M-25V engine like old I-152 and I-16 and its performance was disappointing. Structural integrity once again presented the main problem of the new version and Vorozheikin mentioned in your account personally saw one of them "folding its wings like a butterfly" in combat.

Many Soviet memoirs grudgingly admit that Japanese tactics and logistics at Nomonhan were superior in many ways and better adapted to local conditions. On June 27, for example, two Type 97 scouts (Mitsubishi Ki-15-I Babs?) crossed the front-line, acting as "battle managers"--they instructed large groups of bombers which targets to attack while Jap agents in Soviet rear severed all radio telephone lines leading from HQ to fighter bases. During great battles in June and August the Japanese used to sent a few fighters over enemy airfields in order to bounce the returning and crippled a/c. Already then Soviet airfields were often attacked simultaneously by several groups of bombers that emerged from different directions, confusing Russian ground observers. In August the HQ of General Zhukov himself was bombed so often and so heavily that the Soviets had to deploy all their cannon-equipped I-16P fighters to this area. On downed Japanese planes survival kits and provision for up to 3 days were found while nothing like this existed on Russian side.

Finally it must be said that the result of the battle was decided by regular reinforcements from the Soviet heartland. Anyway, in Mongolia the tanks (not to mention the up-to-the-minute information provided by Richard Sorge's spy ring) and not planes had the final word. To quote Alan Lothian: "Stalin knew that Soviet international prestige was at stake and his new negotiations with Hitler, no respecter of weakness, had reached a critical juncture. Neither blood nor treasure would be spared."

The revelation that the Japanese fighters were more than a match for their own was a major shock for Soviet top brass. In order to save his face Polikarpov (the Soviet "Fighter King") organized a fancy mock combat with a captured Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane against I-16 monoplane before the members of the Soviet government, including Stalin. It's not hard to guess which fighter won. Stalin was not to be fooled so easily, however. Polikarpov soon fell into disfavour and was replaced with younger designers like Mikoyan or Yakovlev. After Nomonhan bloodletting the "mutual support" doctrine was finally abandoned but meanwhile the Soviets had produced so many biplanes that they simply could not replace them before the next war began.

Speaking of Soviet losses. . . A source from long-forgotten glasnost time (Grif sekretnosti snyat, Moscow 1993) admits already a still higher number than 207. I would also advise to check up Lt.Gen. Krivosheev's book.

About Japanese casualties. . . According to Russian sources the "ace" shot down on 29 July by Lt. Victor G. Rakhov (not Pakhov) was Takeo Fuchida. The photo of his downed Ki-27 with white "Ru" Hiragana letter on its tail rudder can be found in almost all Russian publications. [I've corrected Rakhov's name above--DF]

With best season greetings Your
Sander Kingsepp

... which brought this reply from Alexei:

Dear Mr. Kingsepp,

I thank you for your attention to my remark. I read your viewpoints of the Nomonhan events with great interest.

It is very interesting that you collected stories and memoirs of the Nomonhan veterans. I hope that you will publish this narrates someday. Maybe, meanwhile you will post pieces from the stories at Dan's site?

I had also interviewed such people. One was a member of tank crew, three others were airmen. One of them flew missions to escort the fighters of special unit of Capt. Zvonarev, which was equipped by air-to-air rockets. The paper about it was published by me in the journal "Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtica" (Aviation and Cosmonautics), 1996, No.12.

Not so far ago I published brief paper about Nomonhan at the site by D.Sribniy www.airforce.ru and invite you to read it. (It is in Russian).

I can agree with some of your statements, while the others seem to me at least questionable. I decided to comment the latter.

Sander Kingsepp (S.K.) > First some comments on planes involved in this conflict. The main Soviet fighters in Mongolia were Polikarpov I-152 biplane (I-15bis in Russian parlance) and Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 monoplane (better known as the Rata).

I'd like to clarify this statements: the main Soviet fighter of Nomonhan conflict was monoplane I-16, which was known in USSR as 'Ishachok' (i.e. 'Little Donkey'). In Spain Civil War the Nationalists named it 'Rata' and the Republicans called it 'Moskas'. The Japanese dubbed it as 'Abu' (i.e. 'Gadfly')

There were 76 I-16s in Mongolia in May 1939. They were mainly I-16 Type 5, which were equipped with the engine M-25 of 710 hp and armed with two 7.62 mm machineguns ShKAS. It were they who engaged the first air-battles. In the progress of the conflict the other modifications of I-16 were deployed. They were I-16s Type 10 and Type 17: either had the engine M-25B (750 hp). Several aircraft of Type 18 with the engine M-62 (830 hp) arrived in the second half of the summer. A handful of I-16 Type 24, which had the engine M-63 (930 hp), were used in the end of the war. The latter types had already four ShKAS, and the I-16s Type 17 were armed with two 20 mm ShVAK cannons and two ShKASs. In all, 313 I-16s of different types were deployed during the war.

13 of 49 engaged I-15bis fighters were lost in the hot combat on 22 June 1939 and after that these biplanes were not used as fighters anymore (with rare exceptions). They were used mainly for attacks of the ground targets. Note that in this very air-combat I-16s proved themselves: only 1 of 56 I-16s was lost. S.K>The cause was in unstable flying characteristics of I-16--it simply could not hit anything smaller than a decent two-engined bomber.

It sounds really interesting, but according to the official Japanese data, 90 Japanese a/c were lost in combat. 62 of them were Nakajima Ki.27. It is nearly impossible that all these fighters were lost due to Soviet AAA, or shot down by a few I-153. But I can tip you the real culprits - they were Polikarpov's I-16s.

continued in part 3